Abstract: Departing from the
disconcerting fact that the only passage where Kant mentions court practice is
in a chapter on art, the essay undertakes a reconstruction of Kant’s
esthetics. As to beauty, the judgment of taste appears as a judgment on the
ability to judge, and it is universally valid not because it is true, but
because it is communicable. Kant’s notion of art turns out to be the
autonomous discourse of taste as his notion of morality stands for autonomy of
man and his notion of law for autonomy of civil society. However, Kant’s
esthetical experience of the sublime as appearance of what neither mind nor
senses grasp breaks up harmony and autonomy and unjudges judgment. At this
point, the essay uncovers an intrinsically destabilizing force of Kant’s
‚reason‘, traces the consequences for the judicial judgment and
gives a perspective to philosophy of law within a differentiated society.
Ø
zurück
zum Gesamtinhaltsverzeichnis