Andreas Engert, München: Norms, Rationality, and Communication: A Reputation Theory of Social Norms

I attempt to ex-plain social norms without relying on be-havioral constraints (like habit) and normative motivations (like altruism). Instead, the reputation theory of social norms proposed here analyzes norms as mere social constructs: In strategic situations, ratio-na-li-ty fails to provide clear guidance on how to act. Be-cause individuals need to make decisions, they follow norms. Yet norms are subject to strategic manipulation; players can try to upset them by promoting alternative norm proposals. Two factors stabilize norms against this threat: network effects and pre-ference com-pa-ti-bi-li-ty. At the same time, they favor norms that foster cooperation among individuals as well as norms that overcome col-lec-tive action problems. The reputation theory of social norms thus may help to resolve one of the anomalies of rational choice analysis – the fact that col-lec-ti-ve ac-tion exists.

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