Introduction

Between Imperial Heartland and Post-Conflict Region:
Rome and Italy, 201–31 BC*

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1. Setting the Scene

The respective military achievements and fame of the consuls of 168 BC could not have been more contrasting. While L. Aemilius Paullus saw the Third Macedonian War through to its triumphant conclusion, C. Licinius Crassus was not even allowed to take his legions to his Gallic province, owing to a religious flaw which he had incurred whilst summoning his soldiers to the city.1 To be precise, the troops concerned by the augurs’ interdict were the Roman citizen legions. Crassus did in fact march to his province, taking a full contingent of allied troops with him.2 Yet the absence of the legions meant that the consul was denied the materia res gerendi, the means required to accomplish substantive military achievements for the res publica. However effective and large in number Crassus’ Italian troops may have been, his religious transgression – whether trumped up or real – in fact reduced the consul’s imperium to a farce.

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1 Livy 45.12.9–12, with Briscoe 2012, 640.
2 Though, admittedly, no precise figures are given. Yet there is no reason to believe that Crassus marched with fewer allied troops than had originally been allocated to him. As elsewhere in Livy, the phrase socii nominis Latini may be taken to refer to both Latins and other allies; cf., for example, Briscoe 1973, 77–78 ad Livy 31.8.7; Briscoe 2008, 216–217 ad Livy 39.3.4–6. At Pydna, for instance, cohorts from Latin colonies and other allies together guarded the Roman camp under the command of the legatus C. Cluvius: Livy 44.4.0.6–7. In general, the figures given by our sources for troops fielded suggest that the allies often contributed more soldiers than Rome did herself: cf. Ilari 1974, which is not to deny that the Republic stood head and shoulders above any other individual Italian state in military terms; cf. Bispham 2007, 112.
This passage may be cited for the light it sheds on the extent to which Roman military service did or did not contribute to the integration of allied and citizen forces. Yet the text also furnishes us with a suitable starting point for discussing the complex relationship between the Republic and the Italians during the second century BC from a more general perspective. On the one hand, the *socii* made a vital contribution to Roman expansion across the Mediterranean. The final campaign of the Third Macedonian War, in fact, provides us with an impressive case in point here. Allied contingents feature prominently in Livy’s account of the battle of Pydna. In addition, the Italians may have accounted for the majority of reinforcements sent to the East, following the *dilectus* which Crassus had overseen for the benefit of his colleague at the beginning of the year. As exemplified by the iconography of elite houses in Fregellae, Rome’s allies furthermore drew a sense of achievement and pride in their contributions to the conquests made in the Eastern Wars. In addition, the Italians derived significant material advantages from imperial expansion, as illustrated, for instance, by the monumental building projects in their cities, or the prominent roles which the *Italici* played in the economic life of the Mediterranean as a whole. At the same time, however, the position of the *socii* vis-à-vis Rome was distinctly inferior, their participation in decision-making being passive, at best. The figure of Crassus, marooned in Gaul in the company of allied contingents and thus deprived of any initiative, suitably conveys this passive and, at times, marginal place which the other Italians held in the order of Rome’s Republican empire, and to which the Roman consul had himself been relegated in this way.

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3 For the extent of military integration between Rome and her allies, see Pfeilschifter 2007, with exhaustive references to older literature; for a less pessimistic view of integration in the military sphere, cf. Rosenstein 2012.

4 Livy 44.40.5–7; 41.5; 41.9; 42.8. The Paelignian contingent suffered the heaviest casualties among the troops that fought on the Roman side; for additional examples of allied excellence in the field, cf. Pfeilschifter 2007, 36–37. But cf. Erdkamp’s 2007 – in my view exaggerated – scepticism regarding Livy’s accounts of allied military exploits.

5 Livy 44.21.5–9. For the textual problems that arise in respect of the figures Livy gives for Roman and allied soldiers sent to Macedon, cf. Briscoe 2012, 530. For the levies and, in particular, the intricacies of military assignments during this momentous year, see Linderski 1990.

6 Coarelli 1996, 239–257 proposes that the scenes shown are of Fregellan achievements in the First Syrian War (191–189 BC). Maschek 2018 emphasises the importance of imperial conquest to both Roman and allied mentalities, thus planting the seed for the violence that was later to erupt in the Social and Civil Wars.

7 Economic activity in the Eastern Mediterranean: Müller and Hasenohr 2002; monumental building in Italy outside Rome: Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 73–143, with extensive references. In general, for material benefits that accrued to the allies as a result of Rome’s expansion, see Roselaar’s contribution to this volume.

8 For these discrepancies, see now Roth 2019, 148–153.
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2. Themes and Periodisation

The example of Crassus casts light on just one among several important facets of the complex relationship between Rome and Italy, which the contributions to this volume set out to investigate for the period between the end of the Hannibalic War and Octavian’s victory at Actium (see my discussion of our chronological framework below). As reflected by the book’s title, our underlying hypothesis is that the attitudes and events which structured those relations correspond to a wide spectrum of definitions that might initially come across as mutually exclusive. Thus, while certain aspects allow us to speak of the Italian peninsula as the centre of a Mediterranean empire even before the advent of the Principate (‘Empire’), others clearly point towards the centrality of Rome and the Romans – and not just the elite – in virtually all decisive contexts within that configuration (‘Hegemony’).9 As a third strand, we furthermore identify a lack of comprehensive structural cohesion that existed beyond the few isolated spheres of interaction in which we may speak of Rome and Italy in the same breath. As a result, the hegemonic construct was also at a considerable risk of implosion (‘Anarchy’).10 This could and did manifest itself in actual conflicts between Rome and her allies – and, as a corollary, among the latter – which in turn shaped the subsequent nature of their relations. In this way, defining the relations between Rome and Italy in all their complexity also means for us to engage in a search for fitting metaphors of historical description, which do not necessarily correspond to conventional categories of power relations.11

Before engaging in more detail with the themes and structure of this volume, I briefly turn to the contribution which we intend to make to the considerable, existing body of scholarship on the history of Italy and Rome during the mid- and late Republic. Following the precedent of several, recent collections that are germane in approach to this one, we bring together a diverse range of historical approaches here that would have been separated in the past by disciplinary boundaries, and specifically by that dividing-line which exists between archaeology and ancient history.12 Our rationale for this is that the questions posed by this volume are not only broad but also pertain

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9 See now Gargola 2017, who analyses this centrality in relation to how the Roman elite conceived of Italy and the provinces from a spatial perspective; cf. also Isayev 2017, 320–342; 370–394.
10 The danger of ‘anarchy’ and Rome’s successful aversion of it stands at the centre of Fronda’s 2010 monograph on the South of Italy during the Hannibalic War; cf. also Eckstein 2006. The merits and drawbacks of Fronda’s constructivist realist approach notwithstanding, the term ‘anarchy’ approximately describes the centrifugal tendencies in Rome’s allies, which were brought about by the Republic’s inability effectively to integrate the socii within its socio-political structures. This ultimately happened only under the early Principate.
11 Cf. Ando’s contribution to this volume.
12 To mention but a few salient examples: Roth/Keller 2007 (with an explicit focus on inter-disciplinary exchange); De Ligt/Northwood 2008; Roselaar 2012; Pelgrom/Stek 2014. The volume edited by Jehne/Pfeilschifter 2006 similarly forms an important precedent to the present one, despite the absence of contributions that draw explicitly on material culture as historical evidence.
to areas of cultural discourse for which the evidence of ancient written and material sources could be described as symbiotic in character. Therefore, those questions deserve to be subjected to the scrutiny of different methodological approaches. In fact, it is in respect of methodology that disciplinary boundaries undeniably exist, which in turn validates further the proliferation of comparative perspectives at this level.

At the same time – and all methodological differences notwithstanding – both interpretive archaeology and ancient history have a shared existence by virtue of being historical disciplines.13 As such, both (should) employ the building of historical models:14 this is precisely the point at which the inquiries made by historians and archaeologists of a given period enter a large and decisively important area of intersection. Especially in respect of questions concerning power relations and cultural change in Republican Italy, recent years have seen an increasing convergence of both the historical questions asked and the models created by scholars of both text and material culture. It is already possible to see the benefits this is producing in the form of new insights into several aspects of Republican history that had seemingly been open and shut cases. Thus, for instance, historians and archaeologists together have been finding a way out of the conceptual dead-end of Romanisation, and the complex subject of colonisation under the Republic now appears in a very different light from what was the case only a few years ago.15 Any diverging or even mutually contradicting answers that might emerge from such interdisciplinary building and testing of historical models are salutary: contradictions after all form a *sine qua non* in any cultural configuration, in the past as now.16

While the time-span addressed in this volume may not strike most readers as a surprising choice, it is salutary to reflect briefly here on possible ways of periodising the relationship between Rome and the rest of Italy. In analogy to the recognition that alternative ways exist chronologically to frame the Republic’s political history, periodisation equally deserves consideration when it comes to other themes in Roman history, too.17 Thus, to place the beginning of our period of investigation at the end of the

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13 Hodder’s 1982 observations to this effect remain pertinent. A degree of resentment against Ancient History unfortunately continues to survive in some corners of Roman Archaeology, and especially among those archaeologists who are interested in the provinces; for a recent example, see Revell 2016, 1–18. Impressionistically at least, this observation does not to the same extent apply to Greek archaeology.

14 As most appositely formulated for the Republican period by Jehne 2006.

15 Roth 2018 and Stek 2018 provide detailed overviews of the scholarly debates on Romanisation and colonisation respectively.

16 Hölkeskamp’s 2017, 9–42 discussion of Theodor Mommsen’s model-building is of interest here: the discrepancy between the historian’s main text and his footnotes – most notably in the *Staatsrecht* but also elsewhere in his writings – reveal that Mommsen was certainly aware of such contradictions and shortcomings but preferred not to engage with them in the main flow of his argument.

17 Political history: Flower 2010. In respect of the Republican economy – to point to a very different area of Roman history – newly gained insights into ceramic chronologies now suggest that the Hannibalic War may have been much less important as a chronological watershed than was previously assumed to be the case: Olcese 2013; cf. Morel 1996.
Hannibalic War was not a foregone conclusion, and the same holds true of the year 31 BC as our *terminus ante quem*. Viable alternatives exist at both ends. For instance, there would be valid reasons for starting with the years after the First Punic War: these after all saw significant changes in Rome’s attitudes to Italy, such as the establishment of the last two *tribus* or the emergence of the provincial system. In a similar vein, one might consider the Social War (91–89 BC) as a logical – and arguably the most obvious – end-point for a volume on Rome and Italy. However, our chronological choice reflects the central concerns of this volume, namely the tensions between Empire, Hegemony and Anarchy as they unfolded within the wider framework of imperial expansion and incisive political changes.

While it would be overly simplistic to say that the outcome of the Second Punic War was solely responsible for Rome’s relations with Italy after 201 BC, several factors make it a suitable starting point for our discussions in this volume, to two of which I briefly point here.\(^\text{18}\) First, there are Rome’s success in dealing with the Capuan revolt and, to a lesser extent, her harsh treatment of the Twelve Colonies. If we give any credence to the core arguments produced by the Capuan leaders in favour of the alliance, we may furthermore observe that by the time of the Hannibalic War, Rome’s allies increasingly felt that they were being treated as subject states, presumably having lost any meaningful initiative in military affairs.\(^\text{19}\) Conversely, the possibility that other Italian states – and the Campanians in particular – had previously enjoyed some autonomy of action is strongly suggested by their significance in defending the South of Italy against Pyrrhus: as a medium-term consequence of this, the Campanians’ role in bringing about and keeping alive the momentum of the First Punic War should not be underestimated.\(^\text{20}\) Second, the confiscations of land from Capua and other disloyal allies at least contributed to a new wave of colonisation in Italy and thus, ultimately, to the conflict over land distribution that came to a head in the 130s BC and was not to go away again before end of the Republic.\(^\text{21}\) Within this wider framework, it was only after 201 that the Roman state arguably began to develop an increasingly differentiated and authoritative approach to categorising the population of Italy and the respective

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18 Cf. Bispham 2007, 112: “Roman influence in Italy was (to simplify) a consequence of her entrenched position of power after the expulsion of Hannibal and defeat of Carthage”.

19 Livy 23.6.1–2, tellingly in response to the Roman consul’s humble plea for Campanian help in the preceding chapter (esp. 23.5.7: *itaque non iuvetis nos in bello oportet, Campani, sed paene bellum pro nobis suscipiatis.*) It is beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss the changing dynamics of the alliance system in any detail. For critical discussion and exhaustive references to earlier scholarship, see Rich 2008; Kent 2012.

20 Bleckmann 1999; 2002; Kent 2012a; 2012b. If 225 BC was in fact the first time that Rome was able systematically to recruit troops from her allies (cf. Polyb. 2.23–24.), this would have been another decisive point in Rome’s changing relationship with other Italian states, although Carlà-Uhink 2017, 212–217 might be going too far by claiming that it was a key moment in the creation of an Italian identity.

21 See also Roselaar’s contribution to this volume.
statuses of their settlement, no matter how much this might ultimately have been a long-term result of the original settlement of 338 BC.\textsuperscript{22}

In respect of the lower end of our chronological framework (31 BC), our main consideration is as follows. The Augustan Principate ushered in a re-structuring of Italy, cementing its place as the imperial heartland populated by Roman citizens. Most notably, the municipal reform reached its conclusion only then, thereby imposing a new order onto a political landscape that had emerged in the wake of the Social War. Thus, the time that elapsed between the Social War and the rise of the Principate was a period of transition. Over its course, many of the tensions and incongruities of the second century were still present. Largely owing to the works of Cicero we can furthermore observe for this period a rapidly increasing degree of formalisation and politicisation in the relations Rome maintained with other Italian communities, both in continuity with the more gradual developments of the preceding century and by means of incisive institutional innovations.\textsuperscript{23} At the same time, the political map of Italy under the early Principate also echoed what was perceived or, rather, reconstructed to have been the order of Italy pre-91 BC. This is seen not only in the nomenclature employed by our sources – a pertinent example being the respective definitions of municipia and coloniae in Hadrian’s speech on the subject – but also in the manner in which Italian communities celebrated the statuses they had enjoyed vis-à-vis Rome during the period before the Social War.\textsuperscript{24} In a comparable fashion, Augustus was responsible for creating the eleven regiones of Italy.\textsuperscript{25} While their institutional significance escapes us, it appears to have been minimal or non-existent in terms of political administration. Rather, the Augustan regiones may have re-constructed (and mis-construed) certain sub-divisions of the Apennine peninsula that may have had historical roots in the structure of Italy before the Social War, yet in a way that is now beyond our grasp.\textsuperscript{26}

Finally, the chronological range covered by this volume also permits us to think about a fourth possible way of framing the relations between Rome and Italy, namely

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. the contributions by Ando and Roth to this volume.

\textsuperscript{23} For this intervening period: Bispham 2007, with extensive references. The contributions by Blösel, Karataş and Santangelo illuminate different aspects of the changes in Romano-Italian relations during the first century BC.

\textsuperscript{24} Hadrian’s speech: Gell. NA 16.13. Although it is a document of the High Empire, the speech also reflects on the situation under the early Principate. On his return from exile on 5 August 57 BC, Cicero arrived at a Brundisium in full flow of its birthday celebrations – as the colony founded in 244 BC (Cic. Att. 4.1.4). However, the city had been a municipium since the Social War (Cic. Planc. 97), and colonial status was re-assigned only under Augustus (cf. Bispham 2007, 464). This example suitably demonstrates the hold which the perceived or real historical status of Italian communities had over their cultural memory after the Social War.

\textsuperscript{25} Plin. HN 3.6.

\textsuperscript{26} For possible suggestions: Crawford 2002; de Cazanove 2008. For possible ways in which the Augustan order of Italy might have been foreshadowed by second-century precedents, see now Carlà Uhink 2017, 267–276.
as what would be described as a post-conflict region in recent historical and contemporary contexts. Although this point should not unduly be pushed, previous conflicts involving Rome and other Italian states had a significant impact on subsequent developments. This is perhaps most obvious in the aftermath of the Social War which, rather than at its end, we include as a point along our chronological spectrum. The inclusion of Rome’s erstwhile allies and enemies as citizens created significant challenges at a practical level. While being careful not to blur the lines between the Social War and subsequent civil conflicts, moreover, we may see that some of the fault-lines exposed by the latter undeniably had their origin in the long-standing tensions between centre and periphery, which had found their culmination in the Social War.

At the upper end of our chronological spectrum, we have already pointed to a potential post-conflict effect in the case of the land which the Roman state had confiscated from the rebellious allies after the Hannibalic War. Similarly, the case of the Capuans springs to mind as exemplifying a group whose civic status was severely compromised for at least another generation – though probably more – after the city’s revolt against Rome, which thus served as a constant reminder of Campanian guilt in the collective memory of both communities. More obscure though no less striking is the situation of Bruttium and the Bruttians, which arguably offers the best example of post-conflict dynamics that resulted from the Second Punic War in certain regions of Italy. Not only had Hannibal’s Bruttian allies lost large parts of their territory to the Roman state; the region in the deep south of the peninsula moreover failed to settle down into peace for several years after the war had come to an end. Armed unrest was rife, prompting the Roman Senate to assign Bruttium as a praetorian province on more than one occasion in the early years of the second century BC. For at least part of the century, moreover, the Bruttians were not required to provide soldiers to serve in Rome’s armed forces: they were thus deprived of sharing in the benefits which the Republic’s imperial expansion held in store for the Italian Socii. Instead, Bruttian men – possibly our sources refer to members of the elite here – had to serve as apparitores of Roman magistrates on provincial duty. Known as Bruttiani, they thus became henchmen condemned to do the dirty work of an empire of which they were themselves the victims.

27 Livy 38.28.4, 36.5–7, with Briscoe 2008, 104, 123–124–189/8 BC. What precisely was the status of the Campanians remains unclear, yet it is obvious enough that their situation was still negatively affected by the fact that Capua had betrayed Rome nearly thirty years earlier; cf. Roth (in press), with further references.
28 I hope to return to this subject in greater detail in a forthcoming paper.
29 Livy 31.6.2; cf. Briscoe 1973, 70.
30 Gell. NA 10.3.17–19; App. Hann. 61.
31 This is vividly shown in a fragment of a speech delivered by the Elder Cato (Gell. NA 10.3.17–18): the Bruttiani are ordered to beat a provincial subject to death.
3. About this volume

The relations between Rome and Italy thus covered a wide spectrum that stretched between two extreme positions: from the ultimately illusionary claim to imperial co-ownership as displayed by the Fregellan elites at one end, to the systematic humiliation experienced by the Bruttians at the other. Put differently, the 170 years covered by this volume represent a period in which the relative positioning of centre and periphery was intensely negotiated and, at times, violently contested. This obviously culminated in the Social War when the most important among Rome’s allies contested the Roman Selbstverständnis as the unrivalled centre of the peninsula. Rome’s resultant attitudes had increasingly determined her behaviour towards other Italian states during the second century BC.

These Roman attitudes towards Italy form the subject of the chapters by John R. Patterson and Clifford Ando in the first section of this volume, ‘Conceptualising Rome’s Italian Empire’. While Patterson’s analysis draws on a variety of media to elucidate the physical and symbolic presence of Italy and the Italians within the city of Rome during the period covered by this volume, Ando investigates the changing nature of Roman claims to authority and territorial sovereignty in the Apennine peninsula after the Hannibalic War.

The second section, ‘Before Roman Italy: Territories and Societies, 201–91 BC’, focuses on regional aspects of Rome’s relationship with Italy. Roman Roth argues that the unprecedented spread of Roman citizens across the peninsula confronted the Roman state with conceptual and administrative challenges that in some ways foreshadowed the developments after the Social War. In her chapter on the archaeology of urban settlements, Marion Bolder-Boos focuses on typological variabilities in public buildings and urban planning that in part contradict the image of a homogenous, Romano-centric approach to the organisation of Italian towns and their territories.

Next, Stéphane Bourdin provides an overview of the political organisation of the Italic leagues in the Apennine regions. He argues that these leagues became more pronounced as Rome’s hegemony strengthened, to the point that they were responsible for the recruitment of allied forces during the second century BC and subsequently formed the basis on which the insurgents organised their resistance to the Roman hegemon in the Social War. To conclude the section, Saskia T. Roselaar reviews some of the potential fault lines in Rome’s approach to dominating Italy. Rather than offering a mono-causal explanation for its ultimate failure, she argues that the increasing asymmetries in several, central aspects of Rome’s relationship with the allies led to the outbreak of the Social War.

‘Integrating the Italian Romans’, this volume’s third and final section, starts with Guy Bradley’s reassessment of who fought on the rebel side in the Social War, and why. He argues that, contrary to the information given by most ancient sources, Rome’s enemies may not have been confined to the central South of the peninsula. Rather, the rebels’ cause might also have enjoyed significant support more widely, although
the reasons for dissatisfaction, as well as the preparedness to stage outright rebellion appear to have varied from region to region.

This inter-regional complexity further adds to the Social War as demarcating a near irreversible breakdown in the relations not only between Rome and the rest of Italy but also among the former allies, thus rendering the task of integrating new and old citizens a formidable one. 

Wolfgang Blösel suggests that one of the principal mechanisms of this integration – at the formal level of managing the enfranchisement of tens of thousands of men – be sought in the very fact that peninsula continued to be riven by war even after the allies’ revolt had failed. He argues that the recruitment of Italians into the late Republican armies functioned as the key mechanism by which the new citizens were enrolled.

Finally, the contributions by Sema Karataş and Federico Santangelo focus on the challenges which members of the Italian elites faced in their attempts not only to enter the political institutions of the Roman state but also to be accepted into the public life of the city of Rome. Pivotal in this regard was the gradual reorganisation of the former Italian states along municipal lines, which approached a formal conclusion only towards the end of the period with which this volume is concerned. At this point, the idiosyncratic constellation of empire, hegemony and anarchy finally gave way to other tensions between centre and periphery, while the past of Tota Italia emerged as a repository of cultural references for the new Roman state.

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