SUMMARY

Supranational European integration since the early 1950s has been an elite process. The operationalization of supranationality in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Community (EURATOM) not only established a new sort of supranational political actors like the ECSC High Authority, the EEC and EURATOM Commissions, but also caused an orientation of the process of European integration towards elites, i.e. those individual or collective actors exerting a decisive influence on the decision-making process, in the formative period of European integration from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. The concept of supranationality was established to resolve perceived functional deficiencies of the European nation states after World War II and to allow for decision-making by independent experts on the European level in the interest of common welfare; whereas in the political systems of the nation states common welfare was considered to be threatened by powerful vested interests. As a consequence, the supranational European integration process, from the beginning, has been geared to output-legitimacy rather than democratic input-legitimacy (Fritz W. Scharpf). This explains why democratic features like public participation and representation of the people in the early Assembly of the European Communities (EC), later in the European Parliament, were underdeveloped in the EC political system; the invention of supranationality and its inherent functionalist reliance on rational governance by independent experts have provoked some kind of structural democratic deficit inherent to European integration from the very beginning. Although public opinion was not fully neglected, until the early 1970s what Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold called the “permissive consensus” on European integration was considered sufficient for the prospect of European integration. “Permissive consensus” can be described as widespread public affirmation to the general idea of European integration, or European unity rather, combined with considerable ignorance of the integration process under way. Such a “permissive consensus” could be sufficient as long as the output of European integration or the EC satisfied a majority of people in Europe. Essentially, the “permissive consensus” was not only considered sufficient, but was considered decisive for integrationist room to manoeuvre: Only if the public was largely excluded from the discussion of the implications of projected integration steps, progress in European integration seemed to be realizable and integration could be driven forward by European political and economic elites unimpeded by public concern.

This was fully in line with neo-functionalism, the then prevailing European integration theory. As Ernst B. Haas stated in his influential neo-functionalist study of the ECSC “The Uniting of Europe” in 1958, the recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys was impracticable as well as unnecessary. According to Haas it sufficed to study the reactions and attitudes of the political elites towards integration. Haas had close links with the ECSC High Authority and the neo-functionalist integration theory had a decisive impact especially on the EEC Commission under Walter Hallstein.
Against this background, this study deals with the beginnings of a European information policy as pursued by the supranational ECSC High Authority, the EEC and EURATOM Commissions and, after the merger of these European executives in 1967, the Commission of the EC in the formative period of European integration from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. The main question arises, for what purposes these supranational political actors pursued information policies at all, given the seemingly aporetic contradiction between elite-driven supranational European integration and public information.

Information policies are part of the political communication process. In democratic political systems, political communication serves the inherent purpose of generating acceptance as well as the purposes of enabling the articulation and aggregation of interests. Political communication in this sense, influenced by specific interests and strategically directed towards achieving afore defined objectives, can be characterized as "strategic communication" or "political public relations". Political public relations are considered in this study – in relation to political organizations like the supranational European Communities – as the management of communication in the relations between political organizations and their reference groups. Regarding the information policies of the supranational European executives, these reference groups are the people or sections among the people in EC member states and in third countries affected by the policies of the EC – in other words: the general public and specific parts of the public respectively. The supranational European executives used the term "information policy" for the whole range of their political public relations throughout the period under consideration here, although "information policy" is commonly limited to indirect forms of political public relations like media relations.

Given the orientation towards elites in the formative period of European integration, addressing the public by means of information policies did neither primarily imply the normative claim to constitute a critical European public sphere or to enable an open political discourse; nor did it imply to influence public opinion in a manipulative propagandistic manner. Conceptually, political public relations can be differentiated from political propaganda; though political public relations, nevertheless, can serve disinformative and manipulative purposes as well. In general, however, political public relations aim at truthful and factual information, are dialogue-oriented and the audience is not obliged to access the offer of information. Political propaganda, in contrast, can be defined as unidirectional, manipulating communication, not necessarily truthful and using simple stereotypes and concepts of the enemy. Following the "purpose model of propaganda" (Jowett/O’Donnell), propaganda serves the interests of the sender, not the addressee in the communication process, whereas the dissemination of information serves the mutual understanding of both sender and addressee.

Given the basic conflict between elite-oriented supranational European integration and the undeniable public information efforts of the supranational European executives, this study examines their communication strategies in pursuing information efforts for European integration in general and for the EC in particular; more precisely: it examines the motives underlying these information policies, their objectives and the measures taken to realize these information policies. The study aims to sharpen the hitherto rather diffuse picture in historiography of the beginnings of institutionalized European information policies – also as respects their institutional basis and framework – as well as to lay the ground for
further, more detailed research on specific aspects of political public relations for European integration by systematically elaborating the development, the basic structures and main focus of the supranational information policies of the European executives. So far, there is no such systematic historiographical study of the political public relations for European integration. Not least due to the persistent distance between the European institutions and the citizens, the study of the beginnings of European information policies is a desideratum for research.

The findings allow for conclusions concerning the complex interplay between supranational political actors and public opinion; an aspect until recently largely neglected in European integration theory as well as in historical research. Furthermore, the analysis of the information policies of the European executives is to contribute to answering the question of the role and importance of supranational actors in the process of European integration – both with regard to the self-image of the European executives as derived from their information policies and with regard to integrationist consequences of their information policies. Against the background of recent theoretical debates on the role of supranational institutions, the analysis of the information policies of the European executives is to provide insight into the potential and limitations of supranational policy making in a specific field. It is argued here that the information policies of the supranational European executives were most influential in fostering transnational European integration and co-operation, for example between national governments and administrations, non-governmental actors or associations in civil society and the media, and not in directly influencing public opinion on European integration issues.

This analysis follows an actor-centred approach by analyzing the aims and strategies of the European executives’ information policies. It transcends a conventional politico-historical approach by analyzing the information policies from a genuine supranational perspective. In this respect, the three European executives and the EC Commission respectively as well as their institutional arrangements are of special importance for the analysis; at least those administrative units dealing with information policies, in particular the press and information services in their respective appearance from the press and information service of the High Authority to the Directorate-General “Press and Information” (DG X) of the merged EC Commission, the Spokesmen groups and intra- or inter-executive working groups. The supranational perspective is complemented by references to the attitudes of the Councils of Ministers and the governments of EC member states in so far as the information policies were concerned. Concerning institutional history, the focus is not so much on the institutional and administrative set-up and development of those administrative units and actors within the European executives dealing with information policies, but on their actual interaction and rivalry, on actual decision-making and operations, which were sometimes implemented beyond the formal administrative structures. As will be seen in this context, rivalries between the European executives as well as between the information service and the spokesmen groups were a central feature of the supranational information efforts in the formative period of European integration.

According to the supranational approach and the main questions of this study, the analysis is mainly based upon unpublished documents from the Historical Archives of the European Commission (AHCE) in Brussels: relevant documents from the archives of the ECSC High Authority for the period between
1952 and 1967 (inventory Commission des Communautés Européennes, Archives Bruxelles, abbr. CEAB), from the archives of the EEC and EURATOM Commission for the period between 1958 and 1967 and from the archives of the merged EC Commission for the period between 1967 and 1972 (all inventory Bruxelles Archives Commission, abbr. BAC). Of special relevance in this respect were the records of proceedings (with annexes) of the High Authority and the Commissions, the records of proceedings and other documents of the working groups and administrative units in charge of information policies as well as selective records of proceedings and documents of the Council of Ministers and its committees and working groups.

The analysis is organized in two parts: The first part, Part B, deals with the basic principles and institutions of supranational information policy:

Chapter 1 focusses on the legal basis for the information policies of the European executives. Competences for information policies were not literally mentioned in the EC founding treaties, neither in the Paris Treaty establishing the ECSC, nor in the Rome Treaties establishing the EEC and EURATOM. Such competences, however, were deduced from these founding treaties. In legitimizing their information policies, the European executives referred to the principle of public information inherent to the EC treaties according to which they were not only authorized, but virtually obliged to account publicly for their activities and decisions. The commitment to public information was not least a result of the EC financing by the use of public funds. Furthermore, public information was seen as a prerequisite for the functioning of the European Communities. The right to pursue information policies was not, in general, contested by the other EC institutions or by the governments of the EC member states – with the exception of finally unsuccessful attempts by the French government in the course of the “empty chair” crisis (see below). This general acceptance becomes apparent in the annual approval of budgetary funds for information policies, in which the governments of the member states were involved. Altogether, supranational information policies are a telling example of how the European executives as political actors used empty spaces in the EC treaties to broaden their competences and open up new spheres of activity; an example of the dynamics and non-intended consequences in integration processes.

Chapter 2 analyzes diachronically the development of the institutional framework in which supranational information policies were pursued. As soon as the High Authority started working in 1952, information efforts were started, too. A press service has been part of the High Authority’s administrative set-up from the very beginning. Administrative structures, however, were weak in the early High Authority, and this holds also true for the press service. Over the years the institutional framework for information policies became more diversified: the early press office became a fully-fledged press and information service with its operational headquarters in Luxembourg and press and information offices in most EC member state capitals as well as in Washington and London. The work to be done consisted mainly of editing publications, information texts, communiqués and articles on the activities of the High Authority as well as of organizing the participation in fairs and exhibitions, and visits to the seat of the High Authority.
in Luxembourg (these visits were, by the way, referred to as “public relations”). Information efforts comprised short-term information on current events as well as long-term and background information concerning the work of the High Authority. In close collaboration with the press and information offices, the national “sectors” within the press and information service – for Germany, France, Italy, later for Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as an Anglo-American sector – had to adapt the information material to the respective national audiences. A special unit within the press and information service was assigned for information of the trade unions interested in the High Authority’s field of activity. There were also a sector for visits, a sector for written information and information of universities as well as a technical counsellor and a secretariat. The preparation of written information material was coordinated by the “Bureau des Rapports”, headed by Jacques-René Rabier, which was incorporated in the press and information service following a High Authority decision in October 1955. All these sectors and administrative units interacted in pursuing the information policies and built the nucleus for the later Common Press and Information Service of the three European Communities and the Directorate-General “Press and Information” (DG X) after the merger of the executives respectively.

Even after the setting-up of working groups of the High Authority in 1953/1954, consisting of three or four members of the High Authority in order to prepare the decisions of the High Authority and to supervise their implementation, the information service initially remained assigned to the President of the High Authority. This underlines the political importance of the information task and indicates Jean Monnet’s interest in information policies – an interest underestimated in the literature to date.

In budgetary terms, the picture is ambiguous; the explanatory power of the budget for the implementation of the information policies is limited. Budgetary issues are, however, interesting in this context because the discussions about the budget within the European executives as well as among EC institutions allow for drawing conclusions concerning the conditions and significance attributed to information policy issues. As can be seen, the awareness of the necessities and possibilities of information policies differed among the members of the supranational European executives as well as among the European executives and other EC institutions like the Council of Ministers and the Common Assembly; the latter basically being the principal supporter of a better budgetary funding for information policies. Financial shortages have more or less affected the information policies of the European executives throughout the whole period under consideration here. There was a more or less constant discrepancy between the scope of activity and the personal and financial resources of the information service. The scope of information policies even increased with the setting-up of the EEC and EURATOM in 1958, whereas the organizational structure, the budget and the staffing of the information service fell short of these increasing demands; the more so as organizational and budget issues following the setting-up of the EEC and EURATOM Commissions in Brussels remained unsettled for a while. The establishment of the two new Communities put the High Authority under further pressure as regards information policies, although the information service of the High Authority initially pursued information efforts on behalf of the EEC and EURATOM Commissions, too.
Soon after the signing of the Rome Treaties the ECSC High Authority, in principle, pleaded for setting up common services with the EEC and EURATOM Commission, among other fields in the field of information. Irrespective of the general willingness to co-operate, the rivalry between the three European executives became soon apparent in the subsequent negotiations on the setting up of a common press and information service. As the first supranational executive, the High Authority claimed a leading role due to its experience and budgetary independence, but finally accepted the principle of equality between the three executives. The EEC and EURATOM Commissions, too, were willing to co-operate in the field of information policy. However, the EEC Commission considered self-reliant information efforts and the appointment of its own spokesman to be a necessary complement to a common approach. Furthermore, the EEC Commission was suspected by members and officials of the High Authority to contest the principle of equality between the three executives and to raise a claim for leadership on its part. As soon as February 1958, the three executives, in principle, agreed on the creation of a common press and information service emanating from the existing press and information service of the ECSC High Authority. Until a final decision, the latter was to pursue information efforts on behalf of all three European executives. Each executive was authorized to appoint its own spokesmen. The appointment of spokesmen for each executive was in part a consequence of the spatial distribution of the European executives and their administrative divisions between Luxembourg and Brussels. The provision of separate spokesmen should facilitate each executive’s relations with the press, but was also meant to control and channel the dissemination of information more effectively. It became all the more necessary as the inter-executive negotiations on a common press and information service soon were in a stalemate. The dissension among the executives concerning the adequate degree of centralization for such a common service resulted from the already mentioned spatial distribution of administrative divisions between Luxembourg and Brussels and from judicial, administrative and budgetary differences between the ECSC and the EEC/EURATOM. In budgetary terms the contentious issues were the allocation of available funds between common and specific information efforts and the allocation formula between the three executives. Even a failure of the inter-executive negotiations seemed imminent in 1959. Especially the already politically stricken High Authority feared a disadvantageous outcome of the negotiations, particularly in times of a severe crisis in the coal industries. The inter-executive talks on the creation of a common press and information service only came to a successful conclusion when the Presidents of the three executives attended to the negotiations in March 1960. They agreed to create an administrative council for the new Common Press and Information Service (as for each other of the common services, too), in which each executive was represented by one of its members and in which decisions had to be taken unanimously. The spokesmen groups were directly responsible to their respective executives. The Common Press and Information Service consisted of a directorate with the director based in Brussels, an administrative unit for general affairs as well as several technical units for the information of trade unions, agriculture, for overseas information, information of universities, for fairs and exhibitions, radio-television-film, publications as well as for information visits and internships. The officials of the technical units were spatially distributed between Luxembourg and Brussels. Additionally, the

The dissociation of the Common Press and Information Service and the spokesmen groups from January 1961 onwards reflected, in principle, their different tasks: The spokesmen groups were responsible for daily information about the activities of their respective European executive in a technical, economic and political perspective, whereas the Common Press and Information Service had to acquaint the public with issues of the EC and European integration in a more general perspective. This allocation of tasks proved to be far from clear-cut in practice, especially concerning long-term information tasks. Institutional mechanisms to co-ordinate the tasks of the Common Press and Information Service and the spokesmen groups – for example, regular meetings of the Director of the Common Press and Information Service, the Spokesmen and the heads of the information offices – were only partially successful. The parallel structure of the Common Press and Information Service and the spokesmen groups was a constant source of problems concerning the conception and implementation of the supranational information policies throughout the whole period under consideration here – even after the merger of the European executives in 1967.

The perpetuation of this parallel structure in supranational information policies was largely due to a certain inter-executive rivalry between the ECSC High Authority and the EEC and EURATOM Commissions. Especially the High Authority’s original claim to leadership and the EEC Commission’s respective ambitions stirred up this rivalry. This rivalry, which already could be observed during the inter-executive negotiations on the setting up of the Common Press and Information Service, affected the information policies of the European executives until their merger in 1967 and actually prevented them from acting in concert for their information efforts. Nevertheless, the institutional dissociation of tasks was not only to the detriment of a consistent information policy, but also had advantages: The dissociated allocation of tasks also prevented the Council of Ministers and the governments of the member states from effectively monitoring the information policies of the European executives. Moreover, given the functional deficits of the Common Press and Information Service the existence of separate spokesmen groups ensured continued supranational information efforts.

The inter-executive rivalry – which was not confined to information policies – resulted from various causes. In comparison to the EEC Commission, the High Authority suffered from a political loss of importance due to the decreasing economic importance of coal and steel. Concerning the common information policy, budgetary issues as the distribution of costs among the three executives, the allocation formula between the three executives as well as the allocation of available funds between common and specific information efforts remained most contested. The quarrelling over budgetary and institutional issues pushed the information efforts as regards content into the background during this period, the more so as the inter-executive Administrative Council of the Common Press and Information Service indeed worked as a supervisory body, but mostly refrained from influencing the information efforts in terms of content. The spatial distribution of administrative units and staff of the Common Press and Information Service between Luxembourg and Brussels remained also contested among the three executives. On the one hand, the distribution of administrative units and staff was indispensable for an information policy for all the three European Commu-
nities; on the other hand, it hindered communication processes within the Common Press and Information Service and manifested the tense relationship between the three executives. The budgetary and staff issues frequently revealed the fragile consensus among the European executives regarding the Common Services. Apart from institutional and budgetary issues, in general, the conflicts between the European executives centred less on questions of content, but on the significance given to the respective European Community, for example, in the publications of the Common Press and Information Service.

Eventually, the spatial distribution of administrative units between Luxembourg and Brussels – especially the maintenance of the Luxembourg-based units of the Common Press and Information Service – did not only weaken the information policies of the European executives institutionally; contrary to what the members and officials of the High Authority had intended when they defended this decentralized administrative structure, it also boosted the increasing marginalization of the High Authority in terms of information policy. The institutional weakening of the Common Press and Information Service reduced the possibilities of the High Authority to effectively publicize the activities of the ECSC by means of information policy.

As a consequence, the idea of the European executives or even the European Commission after the merger in 1967 as a unitary supranational actor in the process of European integration is by far too simplistic. The conflicts between the European executives on institutional structures, on the distribution of administrative units and staff and on budgetary issues, finally, were conflicts on the political claim for leadership in information policies as well as in European integration in general. Especially in the case of the ECSC High Authority, the first supranational European executive, which vainly attempted to defend its leading position against the EEC Commission, the growing uncertainty regarding its status in the process of European integration became apparent.

After the merger of the executives the problems of co-operation shifted from the inter-executive rivalry to struggles between the then Directorate-General for Press and Information and the European Commission’s Spokesmen group – although these struggles over the allocation of competences no longer had such political implications for the information policy as the former inter-executive rivalry. Aspirations that it would become easier to communicate EC issues in public after the merger of the executives, however, were not satisfied. The merger of the executives altered the institutional framework for supranational information policies: The Common Press and Information Service of the three former executives had become the Directorate-General for Press and Information (the so-called DG X) of the Commission of the European Communities; and its Administrative Council had been dissolved. The DG X consisted of two directorates with responsibilities for “information and information media” – with administrative units for radio/television/film, for fairs and exhibitions, for publications and for visits – and for “information for particular sectors” – with administrative units for information of trade unions, the youth and universities, agriculture, associated African states and Madagascar, science and technology as well as a unit “Contrôle et analyse des moyens d’information”. There were also administrative units for the information of the Commission itself and for the information in third countries. Thus, the allocation of tasks resembled the former Common Press and Information Service; and the parallel structure of DG X and the merged Spokesmen
group, emanating from the former three spokesmen groups, had also persisted. The Spokesmen group was now responsible for the information of accredited journalists, whereas the DG X was concerned with non-accredited journalists. In spite of repeated attempts to improve the coordination of tasks between the DG X and the Spokesmen group, again, these attempts were only partially successful. In 1971, the DG X was re-organized to allocate more precisely than before the responsibilities between the directorate A, which then became responsible for the content of information and its adaption to specific audiences and regions, and the directorate B, which then became responsible for the rather technical task of the use of information media. The allocation of tasks between the DG X and the Spokesmen group, still far from being unambiguous, remained unaffected by this reorganization.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to the role of the Councils of Ministers and the governments of the EC member states concerning the supranational European information policies. Until the early 1960s the interest of the Councils of Ministers and the member state governments in the information policies of the three European executives was rather low – with the exception of the annual negotiations on the budget, in which the information budget was one item among others. Given the increasing demand for information on EC issues in the 1960s, the supranational actors considered the available funds insufficient – even more so as the national governments themselves did not hesitate to make use of EC information media for dissemination in embassies or missions abroad. In principle, the governments of the member states acknowledged the necessity of information efforts by the European executives. Even the heads of state and government acknowledged the importance of intensified information efforts for public participation in the process of European integration in July 1961. Nevertheless, the governments of the member states or the Councils of Ministers frequently prevented a significant increase of the information budget; and attempts by the foreign ministers to establish regular meetings between the heads of the press offices of the foreign ministries in order to intensify public information on the Communities in third countries and among workers in the member states were only temporarily successful.

The European executives, however, pressed for involving the Councils of Ministers and the governments of the member states on a more regular basis in political discussions about their information policies. Thus, in the early 1960s the Council of Ministers or the governments of the member states did not interfere in supranational information policies on their own initiative; the European executives themselves were the driving force behind stronger member state involvement in supranational information policies. At that time, for the supranational actors the prospect of political benefits from member state involvement in information policy issues outweighed potential negative consequences for the information policies of the Communities. The European executives expected the Councils of Ministers to become more appreciative of the financial demands than in the past as a result from a political dialogue on supranational information issues. In June 1963, with the approval of the EURATOM Commission and the ECSC High Authority, the EEC Commission submitted the “Mémorandum sur la Politique des Communautés en matière d’Information à l’attention des Conseils” to the Council of Ministers; for a while, this memorandum served as the basis for a dialogue between the European executives and the Councils of Ministers aim-
ing at joint action in information policies. It was intended to advance the hitherto rather sporadic co-operation between various national administrative units and the administrative units of the European executives.

As a consequence, the Council of Ministers decided to engage the services of the embassies of the member states for the information efforts of the Communities to a greater extent. It was also decided to set up a group of national information experts, which should regularly get together with representatives of the Common Press and Information Service and the Spokesmen groups. The European executives repeatedly emphasized the mere consultative character of the group of national information experts. Although the European executives themselves had originally pressed for involving the Councils of Ministers in information policy issues, it became apparent that the European executives increasingly feared the exertion of political influence by the Councils, in terms of content, on their information policies. This held especially for the High Authority being outside the reference of the Rome Treaties. However, in the following years the group of national information experts did not become as important for the EC information policies as expected – even more so as the group had no mandate for the discussion of budgetary issues. Politically, the hopes of the European executives were not fulfilled: Indeed, the EEC and EURATOM Councils of Ministers agreed upon regular meetings of the press and commercial attachés or the “Conseillers de l’information” respectively in third countries and upon a more substantial participation of the national embassies in the dissemination of EC information media. In addition, they decided to intensify the information efforts outside the EC – but not at the expense of the information efforts in EC member states. Nevertheless, in the following years the governments of the member states adhered to their policy of cutting the information budget in the Council. And after the completion of discussions about the “Mémorandum sur la Politique des Communautés en matière d’Information à l’attention des Conseils” in July 1964, the information issue was not developed any further – apart from the annual negotiations on the budget as before.

One reason for this was the so-called “empty chair” crisis in 1965/1966. However, the specific consequences of the crisis for the information policies of the European executives were rather low. The French government was not successful with their demands that the supranational information policies had to be drafted and implemented only conjointly with the Council of Ministers and that the Council of Ministers should not only control the Common Press and Information Service in budgetary terms as before, but in an all-embracing manner. The realization of the initial demands of the French government would basically have prevented the European executives from pursuing an independent information policy. The Luxembourg compromise on which the Six could agree to settle the “empty chair” crisis provided only for a stronger co-operation between the Commission and the Council of Ministers in drafting and implementing the information programme – with reference to the discussions on the EC information policy in the Council of Ministers in September 1963 and without defining a procedure for this. As regards information policies, the Luxembourg compromise was rather a declaration of intent; the remit of the Common Press and Information Service was not limited.

Although the French government was not formally successful with their maximum demands against the other five governments, the factual consequences
of the “empty chair” crisis for the supranational information policies were am-

bivalent. On the one hand, the information policies were affected in practice by

the ongoing refusal of the French government to deal with information issues on

the Community level - even after the Luxembourg compromise. On the other

hand, the objectives of the information policies of the European executives were

not fundamentally changed after the “empty chair” crisis and the Luxembourg

compromise. Furthermore, against the background of the incidents in 1965/1966

the European executives benefited from the existence of their separate Spokes-

men groups. The multitude of supranational information policy actors – the

Common Press and Information Service and the three Spokesmen groups – could

not be monitored by member state governments as easily as a unique infor-

mation service could have been. All in all, the European executives still asserted

the essential features of their information policies as formulated in the “Mémo-

randum sur la Politique des Communautés en matière d’Information à l’attention

des Conseils” in 1963 and confirmed their claim to pursue an independent in-

formation policy. At the same time, they maintained their categorical readiness to

collaborate with the governments of the member states on information policy is-

sues - a readiness which can be traced back not only to the “empty chair” crisis

but already to the early 1960s.

The dialogue between the – meanwhile merged – EC Commission and the

Council of Ministers on information policy issues was not resumed before 1968.

Although the French government never abandoned their demand for strictly

monitoring the information policy of the Commission, they could not get this

demand accepted by the other five governments, which, in principle, backed the

Commission’s stance to maintain the strict separation of tasks and competences

of the Commission and the Council; the Five also supported the intention of the

Commission to consult responsible officials and experts in the member states

about its information activities and methods, whereas the execution of the infor-

mation policy should remain in the sole responsibility of the Commission. Co-

operation between the Commission and the Council of Ministers wore on in the

following years. In October 1970, indeed, the regular meetings of the group of na-

tional information experts were resumed on the proposal of the Commission; but

an annual debate on information policy issues between the Commission and the

Council, also proposed by the Commission, was not resumed until 1973.

On the whole, it is obvious that the EC Commission or – before the merger of

the executives – the ECSC High Authority and the EEC and EURATOM Com-

missions respectively endeavoured persistently to involve the Councils of Minis-

sters politically in the information policies. In addition, the Commission was not

willing to reduce information efforts in the EC member states for the benefit of

intensified information efforts in third countries as favoured by some member

state governments, especially by the French government. Generally, the French

government tried to establish some kind of control over the information efforts of

the Commission until the end of the 1960s. However, in the whole period under

consideration here, neither the Commission and the European executives respec-

tively nor the French government actually succeeded in achieving their respective goals. Instead, only irregular consultations took place on the political level

that only slightly improved the main problem of the supranational information policies: the lack of financial and staff resources. This, however, had been the

original impetus of the European executives in the early 1960s for trying to inte-
grate the Councils and the member states governments into their information policies more directly.

The second part, Part C, of the analysis deals systematically with pivotal aspects of supranational information policies in the formative period of European integration.

In Chapter 1 the motives and aims which were constitutive for the information policies of the European executives are analyzed. It is argued that the supranational information policies did not have one primary motive or aim, but that the supranational information policy actors have always aggregated several intentions in their information efforts. However, the integration of national administrations in the decision-making process preceded the mobilization of public support; information policies were primarily about bureaucratic procedures, not about democratic responsiveness. The promotion of democratic legitimacy for the European institutions has never been a primary motive behind the information policies of the European executives in the period under consideration here. Even though in the existing research literature the promotion of a European identity is highlighted as one of the main aims of the supranational information policies, the promotion of a European identity is also far from being a primary motive for the information policies of the European executives – at least in the formative period of European integration, i.e. in the period under consideration here. In this regard it is reasonable to differentiate between “European identity” and “European consciousness”. The concept of “European identity” refers to the sentiment of belonging to a European civilization, whereas the concept of “European consciousness” refers to the insight in the necessity to create Europe, the necessity of European integration. In this sense, the promotion of a “European consciousness” was one aim among others for the supranational European executives in their information policies. However, in the period under consideration here, the European executives did not further specify this concept of “European consciousness” or how such a consciousness was to be created by means of information policies. All in all, it was crucial for the European executives to create the preconditions for acceptance of the EC among those directly concerned with EC issues and the public as a whole by means of their information policies and, thereby, to allow for the effective implementation of decisions and the future functioning of the EC. Essentially, it was all about the accomplishment of the EC objectives, the continuance and further development of the EC and their institutions. An emphasis on European identity or democratic legitimization would probably not have been inconsistent in principle with this overall aim; it was just not the favourite method to ensure the functioning of the EC, however.

The specific motives and aims of the information policies of the European executives were multilayered and comprised the need to respond to media coverage and public demand for information as well as contractual obligations to pursue information policies due to the principles of public accountability and public information inherent in the EC treaties. Evidently, the principles of public accountability and public information did not only serve as a legal basis for the supranational information policies, they were also one of the motives for the information efforts of the European executives. It was furthermore intended to propagate the idea of European unity in general – especially in the early years of the
EC – in order to mobilize active public support for it and to create the sort of “European consciousness” (not “European identity”) mentioned above. As the integration process continued, another – albeit not entirely new – motive, closely linked to the propagation of the idea of European unity, came to the fore: information policies in order to emphasize the political dimension of the integration process and the political significance of the EC, which hitherto had been perceived as predominantly economic Communities. Information efforts, thus, were meant to foster the public consciousness for necessary further steps towards political integration.

Information efforts in third countries had the same motives and comprised similar tasks as in EC member states. However, especially in third countries factual and technical information about the EC outweighed the motives of propagating European unity in general and of promoting a European consciousness. This was especially the case for the countries which had applied for EC membership in the 1960s. In these countries it was of the utmost importance for the European executives that decision-makers and public opinion had the best possible knowledge of the structures, tasks and aims of the EC and their institutions. Furthermore, especially in third countries it was considered necessary to defend the decisions taken by the European executives against criticism; in those countries directly affected by such decisions as well as in all other countries in the world in which there was an interest in EC issues and whose attitudes could have a positive or negative impact on the position of the EC in international negotiations. In non-European countries the information policies of the European executives were meant to make known, above all, the EEC and their association policy towards developing countries, especially in the countries of the African Commonwealth. This aspect became even more important since the end of the 1960s when the Common Market was completed and a common trade policy of the EC was established. The DG X considered it necessary then that, as a matter of course, Europe, or the EC rather, was regarded and treated as a unity.

All in all, the information policies of the European executives inside and outside the EC were characterized by the aim to create the preconditions for the future functioning of the EC by means of information efforts. In this respect, the structures and aims of the EC had to be presented, the decision-making processes of EC institutions as well as the motives and the content of specific decisions had to be explained, unjustified criticism had to be rejected and, at large, the EC and their institutions had to be made known and their reputation had to be strengthened. On the whole, the European executives met their own demand to pursue information policies, not propaganda; the information policies of the European executives could hardly be qualified as propaganda in the sense sketched above.

Chapter 2 sketches some basic problems of supranational information policies as regards communicating issues of European integration and the EC. Apart from the above-mentioned structural democratic deficit, which made it at first sight both more difficult and less urgent to let the public participate in the integration process, and apart from above-mentioned institutional problems and the difficult relations with the Councils of Ministers or the governments of the member states the information efforts of the European executives were above all handicapped by the rather economic-technical scope of the EC activities which was of rather limited suitability for personalization and public appeal. Everyday life in the
member states, for example, seemed to be not directly affected by the activities of the ECSC High Authority; consequently, public interest in the ECSC was rather low. Even after the setting-up of the EEC and EURATOM, this awkward situation did not improve – quite on the contrary: the problem aggravated due to the proceeding economic integration; information about the EC activities became more and more technical so that it appealed only to a small circle of experts, even leaving the press correspondents who were used to report on EC issues out from time to time. The European executives were well aware of this problem, which actually stressed the necessity of a coherent information policy; however, in the period under consideration here the European executives were unable to solve this problem.

Another problem for the supranational information policies was the EC decision-making process, which was completely different from the decision-making processes in EC member states and, thus, unfamiliar to the European citizens. Additionally, in the early 1970s a public debate began about a supposed insufficient democratic control of EC decision-making; the activities of the EC institutions were increasingly assessed as negative by the public at that time. Communicating the economic-technical aspects of the early EC was further complicated by the fact that it was in most cases impossible to personalize upcoming decisions or to relate these issues to the everyday life of the people in a way that the issues had greater appeal to the public – problems the European executives were well aware of as well. Connected problems were the spatial distribution of EC institutions and administrative units between Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg and the question of EC symbols which both could not be settled in the period under consideration here. As a consequence of the latter, the means to visually represent the EC were insufficient, too.

Finally, the general impression the European executives or the Commission respectively created in public depended on various parameters which the DG X could only partially influence. These parameters were, for example, the behaviour of the European executives as a whole or of individual Commissioners and staff members in public and towards the public; the communication policies of the Spokesmen groups and other EC institutions; the communication policies of the governments of the EC member states; the relations with accredited journalists and associations in Brussels. Decisive for the public perception of the EC or the European executives respectively as well as for their information policies, thus, were not only the DG X or the Spokesmen groups, but also the EC institutions, services, administrative units and their staff as a whole – and this complicated the implementation of the supranational information policies.

Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the target audiences and addressees of the supranational information policies. Firstly, the motives are highlighted due to which the European executives favoured informing opinion leaders, opinion formers and specialist audiences instead of comprehensively addressing the broader public. Secondly, the relations of the European executives with the media and journalists as well as the information of the youth are highlighted because these are two crucial aspects of the information policies of the European executives.

In the period under consideration here, the target audiences and addressees of the information policies of the European executives ranged, in principle, between the poles of the general public and limited or specialist audiences. The
High Authority, already, tried to inform not only those concerned with and interested in the tasks of the ECSC like governments, parliamentarians, producers, trade unions, employees, tradesmen, consumers or educational institutions (schools and universities), but also the European public as a whole about their policies and the results of their work. The European executives communicated with the respective audiences, especially with the broader public, via the media. In doing so, the media was not only a means of communication, but also an addressee of the information policies. Given the available media ensemble at that time, this indirect approach via the media was, in principle, the only feasible option to achieve the objectives of the information policies. In the early 1970s, still, the only information media by which the European executives could have addressed the general public directly and which could have allowed for mass appeal were radio broadcasts, television and films as well as fairs and exhibitions; but all of these – with the exception of radio broadcasts – were very expensive and, therefore, only sporadically used. The indirect approach towards the general public was a problematic approach, however, for two reasons: Firstly, the media does not only take the information to the addressees, but adapts and modifies the information. The supranational actors under consideration here became fully aware of this only in the 1960s. Secondly, media can promote European integration only to a limited extent. Even extensive and well-presented information on European integration in the mass media is not sufficient to appeal to uninterested parts of the public; in this case, a problem the supranational actors were already well aware of in the 1950s.

Even though it was frequently claimed that the information policies of the European executives had to address the general public as well, throughout the whole period under consideration here the European executives focussed in their information efforts on opinion leaders, opinion formers and specialist audiences. The interaction with a broader audience remained superficial. This focus on influential strata was due to practical considerations and insufficient financial and staff resources in relation to the scope of the supranational information tasks; it was, however, also a deliberate decision by the supranational actors. Opinion leaders, opinion formers and specialist audiences in this sense were, for example, news agencies, journalists and newspapers; economic, cultural and political associations (especially professional associations and trade unions); personalities from politics, economy and academia as well as other public figures; universities, schools etc. It was intended to address, first of all, those who were already susceptible to EC issues and issues of European integration in order to lay the groundwork for a steady education in a European sense and, by it, to foster the development of a European consciousness as sketched above.

After the creation of the EEC and EURATOM the information efforts of the then three European executives remained true to this approach. Some new specialist audiences or milieus, however, were added especially as a result of the deepening of economic integration in the EEC: agriculture, especially rural associations, the rural press, agriculturalists and employees in agriculture. Furthermore, information efforts on overseas territories in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy, had to be intensified as well as information efforts on Europe in overseas territories, especially in Africa. Scientists and industries concerned with EURATOM issues had to be informed, too. Consumers, too, became an increasingly important audience for the information ef-
forts of the European executives in the course of the 1960s. On the whole, the information policies of the European executives aimed at building and developing a network of sympathizers ("réseau d'amitiés") including journalists, trade unions, academics and European movements.

The indirect approach via opinion leaders, opinion formers and specialist audiences did not *a priori* exclude a more direct information of public opinion. But the prospects of such a direct approach were rather critically assessed by the supranational actors. Not least, because the European executives were eager to avoid any impression of simply advertising the EC and, therefore, favoured indirect news coverage by means of the press, broadcasting services and television. Nevertheless, especially from the 1960s onwards the European executives have tried to direct their information efforts more than before towards those audiences which were ignorant or sceptical of the EC. For this purpose, the European executives were anxious to decentralize, regionalize and professionalize their information policies in order to appeal to a broader audience taking into account their genuine interests and familiar environment – especially as regards the information of agriculture. For the information of agriculture, thus, the efforts were centred on the European formation of the leaders of agricultural and rural youth associations and instructors in this field in order to generate a sufficient number of opinion formers, especially among the younger generation, and in order to develop some kind of "sens civique européen" in the EC member states. Concerning the press, the European executives increasingly addressed the regional press and specialized journalists, for example, in the youth press. The quest for the decentralization of information policies was to become a constant feature of the supranational information efforts in subsequent years.

Although the claim for addressing the broader public by means of information policies was never abandoned, the focus on opinion leaders, opinion formers and specialist audiences definitely prevailed until the early 1970s. Only in subsequent years the claim was articulated more decidedly again. Against the background of the above mentioned general motives and aims of the information policies of the European executives, this unambiguous focus on opinion leaders, opinion formers and specialist audiences seems to be reasonable for reaching the aim to provide for the future functioning of the EC and for further European integration by means of information efforts. The functioning of the EC and the further European integration were not dependent on active participation of the general public in times of the "permissive consensus". Besides, it is difficult to imagine how continuous information of the general public could have been accomplished without recourse to opinion leaders and opinion formers such as journalists.

As respects the relations of the European executives with the media and journalists, the emphasis of the information efforts of the early High Authority was on press and media relations, especially on relations with news agencies, which were considered decisive for the dissemination of information. Visits of journalists in Luxembourg or Strasbourg (and later in Brussels as well) were considered to be of similar importance. In the view of the High Authority, frequent contacts with journalists were of prime importance for communicating the anything less than easily comprehensible work of the High Authority to the public. The European executives could generally resort to the assistance of the resident journalists...